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Doing “Development” at the World
Trade Organization: The Doha
Round and Special and Differential
Treatment
Claire Melamed
The term “special and differential treatment” covers
provisions scattered around the Uruguay Round
Agreements; some of these are mandatory, but many
others are not. Utilisation of SDT has been patchy,
but this may be because of deficiencies in provision,
rather than an absence of need. Doha promised an
‘early harvest’ of strengthening to existing SDT
provisions, but there has been virtually no progress,
as a series of deadlines have come and gone. Two key
divisions are over the timing and location of
negotiations and their coverage. Developing
countries wanted early agreement to ‘redress existing
deficiencies’ at a plenary level; industrialised
countries have sought to delay significant change
and shift it to the other Doha negotiating groups as
a bargaining chip. Industrialised countries object to
providing significant SDT to all developing countries
(given that some are major trade actors), but the
developing country group sees no purpose in
discussing differentiation and graduation until there
are proposals of substance on the table. These
cleavages look set to continue. The danger is that
developing countries will have to choose between
bland statements or significant provisions, the
“price” of which is substantial concessions
elsewhere.
Special and Differential Treatment in
Agriculture: Proposals for a
Development Round
Constantine Michalopoulos
The Agreement on Agriculture aims to solve a
problem that most developing countries do not
have: excessive subsidies to agriculture that have
distorted world trade. Its rules are therefore slanted
against them. While there exist provisions for SDT
in the Agreement, they are not wholly adequate.
There are problems with market access, transition
periods, non-enforceability of commitments to
support agricultural development, implementation
of sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and
provisions for agricultural development subsidies.
Another problem is the lack of differentiation
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If One Size Doesn’t Fit All, What
Does? Rethinking Special and
Differential Treatment in the World
Trade Organization
Christopher Stevens
Although the Doha declaration, launching the
current multilateral trade negotiations, puts special
and differential treatment (SDT) at its core,
negotiations have made no progress. This Bulletin
explains why SDT is central to the creation of
development-friendly trade rules and has become
more necessary since theWorld Trade Organization
(WTO) was created. This is because dispute
settlement is now binding. Differences could be
accommodated under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) through ex post fudging.
The problems experienced with the Agreement on
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
demonstrates what can go wrong and why ex ante
agreement is now required. There are many ways in
which differentiation can be incorporated into the
Doha Round. The key requirement is that it should
provide actionable modulations that address the
development issue involved. This has strong
implications for research, which must be issue and
country-specific. It also implies that, while there is
a place for WTO- and Agreement-wide statements
of principle and for modulations within each
country’s national schedules, to be effective some
SDT will need to be limited to sub-groups of
developing countries.
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between, e.g. Argentina and Ghana; it is infeasible
and undesirable to provide the same support to the
former as is required by the latter. The concept of a
“development box” has been advanced to provide
the architecture for improvements. It should
address existing SDT problems and go further to
establish pro-development principles (particularly
on domestic subsidies to agriculture and
safeguards). The overall objective should be a more
meaningful and real provision of SDT treatment
through appropriate instruments to the countries
that truly need it.
Putting Differentiation into Practice:
The Case of Food Security
Christopher Stevens and Jane Kennan
Implementing the SDT goals advanced by
Michalopoulos and others is likely to require
greater differentiation between developing
countries. But on what basis? Taking the example
of food-insecure countries, the article reviews
existing classifications, which are found to be
inadequate. The concept of “national food
insecurity” is developed by analogy with individual
food insecurity. It helps identify different aspects of
the Agreement on Agriculture that are problematic
for different states. Using the classification, the
article suggests more appropriate groups that are
based upon a combination of objective criteria.
These link calorie supply, agricultural dependence,
export market share and vulnerability. Between
them, these criteria can identify countries with the
greatest potential need to support their domestic
agricultural sector (and, hence, not to be restricted
in the use of subsidies) and those most vulnerable
to world market changes that would follow
significant Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) liberalisation (and
hence need adjustment support).
The World Trade Organization and
Competition Policy: Implications for
Developing Countries
Peter Holmes
There exists a strong development case for
countries to have effective competition policies, but
the justification for a multilateral agreement
depends upon answers to three questions. Why
should countries not be left free to decide the sort
of competition policy they want? Does a
multilateral agreement to deal with these have
advantages over bilateral accords? And what form
should any WTO code take? There is plenty of
evidence on the first question that companies
exploit gaps in the coverage of competition policy
(often with the connivance if not support of their
host government). Bilateral agreements are
spreading, and have a role to play, but it is probably
unrealistic to expect them to provide a full
solution. Hence, there is scope for a multilateral
agreement, but uncertainty as to its political
feasibility. The industrialised countries are mainly
concerned to outlaw non-competitive behaviour
that forms a non-tariff barrier to their exports.
Developing countries are more interested in rules
that would curb the anti-competitive activities of
foreign firms (e.g., by outlawing export cartels).
While there appears to be a stand-off, a close
analysis of the stated positions of the EU and India
suggests that there could be room for compromise.




While a transparent and efficient system of
government procurement is developmentally
desirable, it does not necessarily follow that a
multilateral agreement is required. At present,
there are three WTO fora concerned with
procurement and they have different agendas.
Some deal with opening procurement markets to
trade, others with transparency. A focus on
“transparency” rather than “market opening” poses
fewer problems for developing countries, but raises
the question of whether compliance would be
worth the (potentially substantial) cost. Moreover,
the fear is that any architecture established under
the banner of “transparency” will then provide the
foundation for more ambitious subsequent
negotiations on market opening. Market opening
offers the potential gains of cheaper domestic
procurement and improved access to other
countries’ markets. But the first of these can be
achieved through domestic reform, and the
principal constraints on developing country
exports do not require a WTO agreement. Taking
the example of the South African construction
industry, the most direct way to improve export
potential would be for donors to untie aid
procurement.
An Analytical Framework for Further
Research
Christopher Stevens
The dynamic of multilateral trade rounds makes it
difficult to provide an effective research input. To
be useful, SDT must address precisely the
development problems created by new rules, and
this cannot be done until the rules have been
framed with some clarity. On the Uruguay Round
precedent, much of this clarification may not occur
until the eleventh hour. Consequently, research
needs to move on a parallel track to the
negotiations but be framed in such a way as to
facilitate interchange when it is possible and
appropriate. Having identified a potential
development problem, research should offer as
many ways to resolve it as possible, since the WTO
offers multiple routes to differentiation, none of
which is necessarily superior to another. An
analytical framework is proposed that would
classify potential WTO rules according to their
development effects, direct researchers to the
analysis required and identify appropriate forms of
SDT. Starting with broad positions the research and
classification can then be updated during the
course of negotiations as clarification of the
proposals emerges.
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